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BOOK REVIEW 
UNMASKING JUDICIAL EXTREMISM 
RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE 
WRONG FOR AMERICA. By Cass R. Sunstein, NEW YORK, N.Y.: 
BASIC BOOKS. 2005. 252 pp. $16.95. 
Reviewed by Carl Tobias * 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Cass Sunstein has long been an incisive and provoca-
tive legal scholar. Students of constitutional law, the modern ad-
ministrative state, and contemporary political science-as well as 
numerous other fields ranging from cost-benefit analysis to puni-
tive damages-eagerly anticipate the release of his work. Suns-
tein's monograph, Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing 
Courts Are Wrong for America, continues this tradition. He exqui-
sitely timed the book as attention recently focused on two Su-
preme Court vacancies after a protracted hiatus.1 Rarely have the 
Justices been so divided over major substantive and interpretive 
questions, and rarely has such ferment permeated constitutional 
law. Indeed, Professor Laurence Tribe peremptorily announced 
that he was discontinuing work on the renowned treatise, Ameri-
can Constitutional Law, because the scholar could not organize 
and rationalize the divergent areas.2 
* Copyright Carl Tobias, 2009. Williams Professor, University of Richmond School of 
Law. I wish to thank Paul Catanese, Scott Jones, and Peggy Sanner for valuable sugges-
tions; Tammy Longest for processing this piece; and Russell Williams for generous, con-
tinuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. See Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Rehnquist Dies at 80, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 
2005, § 1, at 1. 
2. See Letter from Laurence Tribe, Carl M. Loeb Univ. Professor, Harvard Univ., to 
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These ideas make the publication of Radicals in Robes timely 
and warrant the volume's review. This piece undertakes that ef-
fort. Part I descriptively assesses the monograph. Part II scruti-
nizes the myriad valuable insights Sunstein contributes to read-
ers' appreciation of modem constitutional law and the Supreme 
Court. The review concludes by offering a few suggestions. 
I. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
The introduction, "The Constitution in Exile," analyzes how 
certain judges, scholars, and politicians contend that, because 
America has a written Constitution, jurists who faithfully read 
the document must '"illuminate the meaning of the text as the 
Framers understood it.'"3 Some believe the Justices abandoned 
the text in the 1930s by finding that the Commerce Clause is a 
broad delegation, which Congress used to grant agencies wide 
discretion.4 The Court also ostensibly "blinked away" core Bill of 
Rights provisions-namely the "Takings Clause" -and fashioned 
rights, such as privacy, not mentioned in the document. 5 Those 
observers urge greater textual fidelity by emphasizing the origi-
nal meaning and, thus, restoration of the "real" Constitution, the 
document in exile.6 Sunstein finds very troubling that numerous 
''judges-radicals in robes, fundamentalists on the bench"-
attempt to transform the Constitution, basically reinstituting the 
much earlier version, or perhaps converting it to the more ex-
treme views of the Republican Party. 7 
Sunstein explains that court appointments necessarily mean 
that the Constitution's interpretation will change over time. Re-
publicans have favored judges who would alter Warren Court ju-
risprudence, making the former center the left and the prior far 
right the center, while eliminating what had been the left. Illu-
strative is Justice John Paul Stevens, whose views have essen-
tially remained unchanged, even as the Court's gravity center has 
Stephen G. Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Apr. 29, 2005), in 
Laurence Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291, 292 (Spring 2005). 
3. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE 
WRONG FOR AMERICA 4 (2005) (quoting Douglas H. Ginsburg, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Remarks at the University of Chicago Law School). 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 5. 
6. Id. at 6. 
7. Id. at 6-7. 
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shifted.8 Sunstein concedes that the Justices have rejected some 
extreme modifications, as judges generally follow precedent, yet 
warns that a few doctrinaire appointments could prompt more 
radical change, voicing special concern about the "close fit be-
tween [extremists'] own political commitments and the Constitu-
tion itself."9 
Part One, "The Great Divide,'' has two chapters.10 The first de-
fines and explores relevant interpretive schools. One school is the 
"fundamentalism" described above. 11 Because its proponents ap-
preciate that constitutional doctrine now reflects other perspec-
tives, they seek large-scale alterations through broad, clear 
rules.12 The second school is "minimalism,'' which treats constitu-
tional law as a "series of incompletely theorized agreements" 
whereby judges accept a particular view on doctrines, such as 
equality, without subscribing to its deepest foundations. 13 Mini-
malists concomitantly respect precedent because it vitiates the 
need to answer the most basic questions presented by new issues 
and fosters stability, though they prefer narrow disposition and 
resolving one case at a time. 14 Thus, minimalism comprises a me-
thod and a restraint while it is neither a program nor a mandate 
for specific results. 15 Sunstein asserts that modern constitutional 
disputes are best understood vis-a-vis the split between this idea 
and fundamentalism which, for instance, dominates the most crit-
ical debates within the High Court and Senate judicial confirma-
tion fights. 16 
Other views do exist. "Perfectionism" holds that judges should 
make the Constitution as good as possible by interpreting its ca-
pacious, general phrasing so as to cast the document's "ideals in 
the best possible light."17 For example, when precedent leaves 
gaps or ambiguities, jurists should attempt to improve the law. 
Justices William Brennan and William Douglas, who lack succes-
8. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, § 6, at 50. 
9. SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 19. 
10. Id. at 23-78. 
11. See id. at 25. 
12. See id. at 26-27. 
13. Id. at 28. 
14. See id. at 28-29. 
15. Id. at 29. 
16. Id. at 30. 
17. Id. at 32. 
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sors on the present Court, are illustrative.18 The fourth approach, 
"non-partisan restraint" or "majoritarianism," champions defe-
rence to the elected branches-unless their actions clearly violate 
the Constitution-because judges are fallible and a powerful judi-
ciary could injure democracy. 19 Sunstein finds that no sitting Jus-
tice is a committed majoritarian.20 
"Each position is vulnerable to coalitions of the other three," 
but minimalism and fundamentalism now dominate constitution-
al thought. 21 Sunstein emphasizes the latter in chapter two. "His-
tory's Dead Hand" shows how fundamentalists endorse "original-
ist" interpretations and assesses ways that the fundamentalists' 
approach could threaten democracy and jeopardize Americans' 
rights by freezing the Constitution as of 1787.22 
The second part, "Great Divisions," canvasses quite a few im-
portant modern constitutional issues, such as affirmative action, 
national security, privacy, and separation of powers.23 Sunstein 
demonstrates how applying the theories of construction yields 
particular results in specific doctrinal areas. For instance, he con-
siders fundamentalism overbroad and retrogressive while assert-
ing that minimalism takes a rather incremental and progressive 
approach. 24 
II. CONTRIBUTIONS 
Sunstein offers numerous cogent insights. Most significant, he 
descriptively analyzes four main interpretive schools and how 
they resolve constitutional disputes today while explaining why 
minimalism is preferable and fundamentalism is incorrect and 
even dangerous. Considerable previous research has assessed in-
dividual cases, doctrinal modifications, and emerging trends; 
however, Radicals in Robes is one of the best new treatments. 
Sunstein painstakingly documents relevant historical phenome-
na, evaluates and imposes a salutary conceptual framework on 
18. Id. 
19. See id. at 48-50. 
20. Id. at 50. 
21. Id. at 50-51. 
22. See id. at 53-78. 
23. See id. at 81-252. 
24. See id. at 108-09 (discussing the difference between the minimalists' and the fun-
damentalists' approaches to the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade). 
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major opinions, identifies crucial jurisprudential and political 
linkages, and astutely elucidates how the whole is often more 
than the sum of its parts. 
The remarkable detail and clarity with which Sunstein ex-
plores the four dominant positions are instructive. Sunstein re-
views the approaches' backgrounds and philosophical founda-
tions, their contemporary relevance, and the schools' benefits and 
disadvantages. The writer shows that majoritarianism and per-
fectionism are distinguished historical views with little represen-
tation on the current bench. Now, minimalism enjoys substantial 
public and judicial support while fundamentalism is ascendant-
a juxtaposition which prompts their comparison. Sunstein advo-
cates minimalism, contending that it respects the elected 
branches through allowance for democratic self-government and 
recognizes judges' limited role by favoring incremental court deci-
sions and opposing expansive judicial power. 
Telling are Sunstein's criticisms of fundamentalism that would 
freeze the Constitution as it was when it was ratified, as jurists 
must construe the document in accordance with original intent. 
This, Sunstein contends, would eviscerate Americans' democracy 
and rights by undermining political-branch authority and many 
of the freedoms that citizens now enjoy. Sunstein describes how 
the idea fosters horizontal accretion in courts of power formerly 
held by the elected branches, shifts authority's prior vertical bal-
ance to the states away from the federal government, and con-
stricts legislation that safeguards Americans' rights. For exam-
ple, the author denigrates the recent judicial narrowing of 
Congress's "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,"25 the 
Fourteenth Amendment and shows that treating the Justices, ra-
ther than lawmakers, as propriety's arbiters is an invention 
based on miscomprehension of Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which simultaneously undercuts legislative authori-
ty to protect citizens and expands judicial power. 26 
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5. 
26. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 240-41; see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999) (holding that the patent laws 
that "abrogated the States sovereign immunity from claims of patent infringement" could 
"not be sustained as legislation enacted to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment"); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (holding that Congress 
exceeded its power when it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993). 
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Sunstein disparages the Justices' similar restriction of congres-
sional authority to pass laws under the Commerce Clause and 
shows that making the Justices, not Congress, judges of "effects" 
on commerce is basically a fiction premised on the clause's mi-
sapprehension, which undermines legislative power-especially 
to safeguard the public-and increases judicial authority. 27 Both 
the Section 5 and Commerce Clause interpretations, which sug-
gest that evidentiary records underlie statutes' passage and imp-
ly that the Court's decisional methods are better than lawmaking 
procedures,28 have no constitutional underpinning. Sunstein criti-
cizes the Justices' analogous determination that federal authority 
cannot support particular legislation because it commandeers 
states under the Tenth Amendment or invades their sovereignty 
under the Eleventh.29 He also shows that the ways certain Justic-
es read Section 5 and the Commerce Clause, as well as invoke the 
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, epitomize how fundamental-
ists betray the commitment to originalism when historical evi-
dence yields undesirable results or even ignore the applicable his-
tory, suggesting that they favor partisan ideology, not law.30 
Sunstein's clarification of the rhetoric which suffuses much dis-
course about the Constitution and the Justices is similarly effica-
cious. For instance, Sunstein finds woefully insufficient the de-
scription of constitutional battles as fights between liberal and 
conservative ideology, even while showing how much the Court 
has drifted rightward, using Justices, namely William Rehnquist 
and John Paul Stevens, as foils, and the Court's gravity shift, 
which eliminated the left. He also suggests the inherent deficien-
cies of employing ''judicial activism," observing that this pheno-
menon is frequently manifested on the spectrum's conservative as 
well as its liberal end.31 
27. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 240-41. 
28. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
29. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 235-41. As to the Tenth Amendment, see Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935-36 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring), and New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). As to the Eleventh Amendment, see Fla. Prepaid, 
527 U.S. at 634-35, and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999). 
30. "Too much of the time, fundamentalists read the Constitution not to fit the origi-
nal understanding but the views of the extreme wing of [the) Republican Party." 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 244. 
31. See id. at 41-44. 
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Sunstein's astute critique should also reach a wide audience. 
Despite the complexity intrinsic to the theoretical, political, and 
constitutional questions evaluated-as well as the obscure nature 
of the judicial decisions and interpretative approaches reviewed-
his clear, thorough explication and informal, often colloquial, 
style will facilitate this work's broad dissemination. Attorneys 
and law students will easily comprehend the volume, but a multi-
tude of readers without legal training should find the book access-
ible and instructive. 
Sunstein's incisive perspectives have greater force because 
their exponent is a legal scholar who certain observers might as-
sume would favor perfectionism. He trenchantly criticizes this 
view and fundamentalism in essence for analogous reasons, 
namely that both sacrifice practicality to absolutism. Sunstein 
espouses minimalism because the approach respects federal 
elected-branch prerogatives, contemplates a narrow judicial role, 
and favors incremental change. 
Ill. SUGGESTIONS 
Despite Sunstein's many insightful contributions, I can posit 
several constructive ideas. Elaborating a few notions would im-
prove appreciation of present constitutional disputes and the Su-
preme Court. For example, knowing that fundamentalism may at 
once erode American democracy and citizens' rights is valuable. 
Equally useful would be more consideration of how it affects hori-
zontal power distribution given each administration's tendency to 
claim greater authority, particularly vis-a-vis Congress. It may 
also be beneficial to identify the vertical effects of such power dis-
tribution. National power's devolution to the states-a central 
fundamentalist tenet-may be anachronistic, and even danger-
ous, during a time of international crises, especially considering 
the upheaval fostered by world terrorism. Detailing the horizon-
tal and vertical impacts may correspondingly elucidate modern 
American debates, such as the preferable governmental branch 
and level for treating complex societal issues, namely crime, nat-
ural disasters, and the tensions between national security and 
civil liberty. All this information would help policymakers and cit-
izens decide whether increasing judicial power at the expense of 
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the other branches and states' authority vis-a-vis the federal gov-
ernment advantages the country as matters of structure, power, 
and citizen rights and, if not, how to alter those trends. 
Sunstein also might have explained precisely how minimalism 
applies to specific past, current, and future issues. One general 
illustration is the Court's privacy decisions, which trace their 
modern lineage to Griswold u. Connecticut.32 Particular examples 
are the questions of reproductive freedom that involve Roe u. 
Wade33 and its progeny; gay rights as implicated by Lawrence u. 
Texas; 34 and equal protection, critical to the Court's decisions in 
Brown u. Board of Education,35 Grutter u. Bollinger,36 and Baker 
u. Carr,37 which involves reapportionment, the "thickest thicket."38 
Minimalism could place greater trust in elected officials than his-
tory warrants, as the desegregation and reapportionment cases 
show. Modern constitutional theory and law, evidenced by foot-
note four in Carolene Products and numerous precedents, conco-
mitantly hold that an integral judicial function is protecting mi-
nority rights from majoritarian tyranny.39 
These concerns do not detract from Sunstein's valuable contri-
butions. However, he might have reviewed a few areas explicitly 
or with increased specificity, derived additional lessons from fun-
damentalism's rise, and offered more suggestions for rectifying or 
ameliorating the present circumstances. It would be helpful to 
have additional views from an expert observer who has so meticu-
lously scrutinized constitutional interpretation, the Supreme 
Court, separation of powers, federalism, and politics. For in-
stance, Sunstein might have assessed the effects of campaign 
finance regimes, legislative reapportionment schemes, and in-
cumbency's power on the phenomena he analyzes, as well as how 
the unelected judiciary, the least democratic branch, has ironical-
ly become the greatest moderating force in the national arena. 
32. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled in part by Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), 
and Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
34. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
35. 34 7 U.S. 483 (1954). 
36. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
37. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
38. See Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial 
Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325 (1987). 
39. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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Thus, Radicals in Robes may be profitably compared with new 
works by other students of constitutional interpretation and the 
High Court, namely Justice Stephen Breyer's Active Liberty,40 
Professor Jeffrey Rosen's The Most Democratic Branch,41 Profes-
sor Mark Tushnet's A Court Divided: The Rehnquist Court,42 and 
ABC Supreme Court Correspondent Jan Crawford Greenburg's 
Supreme Confiict.43 These ideas are particularly salient when 
controversial and powerfully held views about the best ways to 
interpret the Constitution, protect citizens' rights, appoint judges, 
distribute governmental authority, and correspondingly preserve 
horizontal and vertical structural integrity suffuse modern de-
bate. 
CONCLUSION 
Radicals in Robes substantially advances understanding of 
modern constitutional interpretation and the Supreme Court, 
particularly by showing how fundamentalism's ascension might 
undermine democracy and citizen rights. Sunstein illuminates 
this jurisprudential approach's revitalization, its deleterious im-
pacts, and a salutary response in the form of a preferable 
theory-minimalism. That concept accords the elected branches 
greater respect while it better protects citizens' rights and limits 
judicial power. 
40. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITU-
TION (2005). 
41. JEFFERY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: How THE COURTS SERVE 
AMERICA (2006). 
42. MARK TuSHNET, A COURT DMDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE F'UTURE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005). 
43. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2007). 
